The objective of this prohect is to analyze the mechanism governing social housing allocations in France. More specifically, I intend to measure the importance of leaving scope for applicants to reveal their preferences through choice within the allocation process. In France, as in many other countries, social housing units are allocated through take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) offer: household applu to a municipality and mar get offered a unit, which they can only accept or reject. Rejections are generally costly, incentivizing applicants to accept an offer which is only marginally better then their current situation. Alternative mechanisms can ask a household to applu to a specific unit or neighborhood, leading them to reveal a lot more about their preferences, and potentially increasing the match surplus. This paper tries to quantify the cost of TIOLI offers in terms of match surplus.
Applicant preferences and match surplus in social housing allocations: evidence from France
Data provided through CASD (33)
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